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Abstract 
Mass media plays a crucial role in information distribution and thus in the 
political market and public policy making. Theory predicts that information 
provided by mass media reflects the media’s incentives to provide news to 
different types of groups in society, and affects these groups’ influence in 
policy-making. We use data on agricultural policy from 60 countries, spanning a 
wide range of development stages and media markets, to test these predictions. 
We find that, in line with  theoretical predictions, public support to agriculture is 
strongly affected by the structure of the mass media. In particular, a greater role 
of the private mass media in society is associated with policies which benefit the 
majority more: it reduces taxation of agriculture in poor countries and reduces 
subsidization of agriculture in rich countries, ceteris paribus. The evidence is 
also consistent with the hypothesis that increased competition in commercial 
media reduces transfers to special interest groups and contributes to more 
efficient public policies.  
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 Mass Media and Public Policy:  
Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a rapidly growing literature on the economics of the mass media, leading to a 
series of important new hypotheses and insights in an area which for a long time was 
neglected by economists (McCluskey and Swinnen, 2008). An important part of this 
literature concerns the role of mass media in political markets and its effect on public 
policy-making. Most of this literature on the relationship between mass media and 
public policy is theoretical. A few empirical studies have tried to assess the effect of 
media on policy outcomes. Some key findings from this literature suggests that access 
to mass-media empowers people politically, and, as such, increases their benefit from 
government programs (Strömberg and Snyder, 2008). This influence has been found for 
different types of government programs and different countries, such as unemployment 
relief in the United States (Strömberg, 2004b), public food provision and calamity relief 
in India (Besley and Burgess, 2001, 2002), and educational spending in Uganda and 
Madagascar (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Francken et al., 2009). All of these studies 
measure the effect within a single country, which has the benefit of keeping many other 
factors fixed but has the potential disadvantage of having limited variation in policy and 
media 
Our paper wants to contribute to this empirical literature by analyzing the 
impact of mass media on policy-making for a specific type of policy across a wide 
variety of countries. We use a new dataset which has been produced by the World Bank 
which includes measures of agricultural subsidization and taxation for a much wider set 
  2of countries and longer period of time than has been available before (Anderson and 
Valenzuela, 2008). We use these data as dependent variables.  
Agricultural policy (subsidization or taxation) is an excellent policy instrument 
to study the impact of media on policy choice across a wide variation of countries for 
both empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, agricultural policy is an important 
policy for governments in both rich and poor countries. In poor countries where 
agriculture is a very important share of the economy and where food is a major 
consumption item the importance of agricultural policy as a public policy issue is 
obvious. However, also in rich countries agricultural policy remains disproportionately 
important compared to the relatively small share of agriculture in terms of economic 
output. For example in the EU, the Common Agricultural Policy continues to absorb 
40% of the entire EU budget. Another symptom of this continued importance of 
agricultural policy for rich countries is the stand-off in the current WTO negotiations 
where disagreements over agricultural policies is now threatening to undermine the 
entire WTO agreement. 
Also from a theoretical perspective agricultural policy is an interesting case. The 
literature on the political economy of agricultural policy identifies group size (the 
number of farmers versus the number of food consumers in the economy) as an 
important causal factor. Group size is argued to play an important role because it affects 
collective action costs (based on Olson, 1965) and because it affects per capita costs 
and benefits of agricultural policy, which then affects political outcomes in the presence 
of voter information costs (based on Downs, 1957), or if political activities are 
proportional to the size of the potential policy costs and benefits (Swinnen 1994). 
Recent papers in the media economics literature claim that mass media can play an 
  3important role in public policy, precisely by altering these political economy 
mechanisms (Stromberg 2001, 2004a; Kuzyk and Mc Cluskey, 2006). In fact, 
Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2005) argue that the link between group size and 
political mobilization depends on the structure of media markets. In a series of 
influential papers, Strömberg (2001; 2004a) has shown that competition among the 
mass media leads to the provision of more news/information to large groups such as 
taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, altering the trade-off in political 
competition, and thus influencing public policy. He refers to this outcome as ‘mass 
media-competition-induced political bias’.  
The purpose of our paper is to evaluate whether mass media has an impact on 
the political economy of agricultural policies using data from many countries. In this 
way this paper contributes to an emerging literature analyzing whether the diffusion of 
free and independent media are key ingredients to more efficient public policies. Besley 
and Burgess (2001, 2002) use a political agency model to show that having a more 
informed and politically active electorate increases the incentives for a government to 
be responsive. Prat and Strömberg (2005) show, for Sweden, that people who start 
watching commercial TV news programs increase their level of political knowledge 
and their political participation. Overall, this and other evidence support the idea that 
mass media weakens the power of special interest in lobbies relative to unorganized 
interests.  
The paper also contributes to the literature on the political economy of 
agricultural policies. While there is an extensive literature, both theoretical and 
empirical, on what determines agricultural policy-making (see de Gorter and Swinnen 
  4(2002) and Swinnen (2009) for surveys), no study so far has looked at the role of the 
media in this process. Our paper is the first to do so.  
Our analysis, based on a sample of 60 countries, indicates that mass media may 
have a substantive impact on public policy towards agriculture. In the developing 
world, agricultural taxation is reduced  by the presence of mass-media, while  in 
developed countries agricultural support is reduced. A key implication of our results is 
that by increasing government accountability, competition in the media market will 
reduce distortions in agricultural policy 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
In this section we first present a theoretical framework based on Strömberg’s 
(2004a) model of mass media and political competition. Then we discuss the main 
implication of the model in the light of the worldwide characteristics of media markets 
and regularities on agricultural policies. Next, we identify testable hypotheses about the 
effect of mass media competition on agricultural policy outcomes.   
 
2.1 Theory  
Two parties, L  and R, make binding announcements about the amount zs of 
public money they plan to spend on each of S > 2 government programs. The two 
parties set zs with the objective to maximize the number of votes. Given N = Σ ns the 
total number of voters, and ns the voters in group s who benefit from the program s, the 
assumption is that each voter benefits from exactly one program. Government spending 
is constrained by the usual budget rule, Σ nszs ≤ I, with I the total budget. 
  5Two media firms, A and B, called, for simplicity, newspapers, are the only 
channel through which the parties’ platforms are announced to the voters. The media 
firms allocate the space quantity, q
A and q
B, on the S spending levels, with the objective 
of maximizing the number of readers, identical to N voters. Each voter buys only one 
newspaper, A or B, and, by reading it, will develop some expectations concerning party 
spending; they will then vote for party L or R (no abstention). The party that wins the 
election implements the promised expenditure plan.  
Voters are assumed to use the media information from newspapers to fully 
realize the potential gains embedded in the government program. Thus, more precise 
information on future policies increases the probability that voters will choose the right 
action. Specifically, voters realize utility ui(zs) = θi  u(zs) from the program, when 
information on zs is known in advance. On the contrary, uniformed voters receive the 
utility ui(zs) = θi u(zs) − vs, where vs is the (exogenous) utility loss. The parameter θi 
captures the idea that the program can be more valuable to some individuals than to 
others.  
It is assumed that all the voters who use program s have an incentive to read any 
article they find on zs, while voters that do not use program s do not read the relevant 
articles. Thus, the probability that a reader will spot some news in the newspaper, ρ, 
increases with the space allocated for this news, but at decreasing rate: ρ′ (qs) > 0, ρ′′ 
(qs) < 0. Next, by denoting the expected utility from a newspaper with news profile q to 
a reader in group s as ws (qs) = ρ (qs) vs, we have w′s (qs) > 0 and w′′s (qs) < 0. 
The reader’s newspaper evaluation also depends on other (exogenous) fixed 
characteristics, like ideology, captured by parameters a i and bi. The news profile of 
  6newspapers  A  and  B  then  give expected utility ws ( qs
A) + a i  and  ws ( qs
B) + b i 
respectively to the voter i using program s. The voter buys newspaper A when Δws = ws 
(qs
A)  −  ws ( qs
B)  ≥ b i  −  ai, and newspaper B otherwise. The newspapers assign a 
probability distribution Gs ( ⋅), with density gs ( ⋅), to the difference bi  −  ai. The 
probability the newspaper attaches to individual i reading newspaper A is Gs (Δws). 
If both newspapers have the same cost function, newspaper A’s expected cost 
function, C, is assumed as the following linear form 
 




B A q c q q C ,    ∑ Δ
s
s s s s c w G n , ] [     (1) 
                first copy costs   reproduction/distribution costs    
 
where cq is the cost of producing one unit of news space, and cs is the average cost of 
reproducing and delivering a newspaper to readers in group s. 
Let ps be  the increase in marginal profit from selling an additional newspaper to 
a voter in group s. This includes the price of the newspaper plus the price per reader in 
group s paid for by advertisers, minus the average cost of reproducing and delivering a 
newspaper to a person in group s. The expected profit function of newspaper A is then  
 
( ) [ ] ∑ ∑ − Δ =
A
s q s s s s
A q c w G n p E π .     (2) 
 
Under this setting, Strömberg (2004a) shows that the Nash Equilibrium in the 
competition between the two newspapers implies that the ratio w′s (qs
A)/w′s (qs
B) = 1 for 
  7all s, and both newspapers set the same news profiles, q
A = q
B. For all s, the equilibrium 
condition is  
q s s s s c q v p n = ) ( '
* ρ .     (3) 
 
Relation (3) defines the equilibrium news profile, qs*, as a function of several variables. 
More specifically, qs* will be higher for groups more valuable for advertising, groups 
with a higher private value of news and for news that concerns large groups. 
How do these results affect policy bias in the political market ? Assume that a 
voter i derives utility ui (zs
L) + li and ui (zs
R) + ri from the implemented platform of 
parties  L  and  R, respectively; with li and ri describing preferences for other fixed 
policies or candidate characteristics. The model assumption is that the voters are unable 
to resolve a unique political equilibrium spending level, which thus makes media 
information concerning these spending levels valuable to them. Thus, voter i votes for 
party L if  Δui = Ei [ui (zs
L) − ui (zs
R)] ≥ r i − li, and for party R otherwise. Voters 
informed about party policy announcements have Δui = ui ( zs
L)  −  ui ( zs
R), which 
represents the differences in the party platforms. Instead, for the uninformed voters, 
i u Δ  remains constant as it is independent from party announcements. 
Political parties, in maximizing the chance of re-election, assign a probability 
distribution Fs to the difference ri − li. The probability that individual i votes for party L 
is Fs [Δui].  Thus, the expected number of voters for party L is given by   
  
() [ ] ( ) [ ] ∑ Δ − + Δ =
i
i s s i s s
L u F u F n E ρ ρ 1 .    (4) 
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At equilibrium, parties L and R equate the ratio between average marginal utility u′s 
(zs
L)/u′s (zs




*, for all s, and for some constant λ > 0,  .   λ ρ s s s s s n z u q n = ′ ) ( ) (
* *
This equilibrium condition implies that the equilibrium spending levels equate 
marginal utilities weighted by the share of voters in the group who find news on 
election platforms. As a corollary, it follows that equilibrium spending on program s, 
zs
*, is increasing in the share of informed voters, ρs,  the size of the group, ns, the 
revenue per reader in the group, ps, and the private value of news, vs:  
 
) , , , (
* *
s s s s s v p n z z ρ = .   (5) 
 
In summary, the media competition will induce a policy bias towards large 
groups because the voters in these groups are more informed, since the mass media 
targets these groups. It is important to note that the size of the group, ns, as well as the 
revenue per reader in the group, ps, only affect spending via the media market. Put 
differently, the bias towards large groups is indirect, and only a consequence of media 
competition. 
 
2.3 Testable hypotheses for agricultural policy   
This section discusses the empirical implications and applicability of the model 
to agricultural policy outcome. The most important stylized fact about agricultural 
protection and support is the so called ‘development paradox’, namely the taxation-
  9protection switch of agriculture associated with economic development.
1 The classic 
interpretation for this pattern is that, on moving from developing to industrialised 
countries, the farm groups, compared to the consumer and taxpayer groups, become 
more effective in collective action, as a consequence of the smaller farm numbers and 
the lower communication and transportation costs inherent in industrial development, 
all factors that reduce organizational costs and free rider problems for collective action 
(Olson, 1965). Moreover, since the per capita cost on the rest of society falls with less 
farmers, the opposition of taxpayers and consumers to (agricultural) subsidies decreases 
as the number of farmers decreases with economic development (Becker, 1983; 
Swinnen, 1994; Anderson 1995). 
The model developed here suggests that the relationship between agricultural 
protection and economic development will be affected by the introduction of media 
competition in the political market. Voter preferences and government policies will be 
affected by how the media industry provides information to the people. The key 
prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, government transfers like agricultural 
protection should, as an effect of media competition, be biased toward large groups
2. 
Because the agricultural group is relatively large in poor countries and relatively small 
in richer ones, an important implication of the model is that, all other things constant, 
the effect of media competition on agricultural protection should be different in poor vs. 
rich countries. More specifically, we expect that the impact on agricultural protection 
                                                 
1 See Anderson (2008) for recent evidence. 
 
2 Interestingly, this prediction goes exactly in the opposite direction with respect to the traditional 
political economy model that does not consider the effect of media bias, like the Becker (1983) and 
the Swinnen (1994) models. In fact, in those models government transfers tend to be biased toward 
small groups, in line with the well known ‘paradox of numbers’ of Marcur Olson (1965). 
  10induced by mass media competition should be positive in poor countries, and negative 
in rich countries. Thus, we can formulate the following empirical prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Mass media-competition-induced political bias should reduce 
agricultural protection in rich-(developed) countries, but it should increase it in poor-
(developing) countries, ceteris paribus.    
 
The model assumes that mass media companies maximize profit. This 
assumption is important because many countries in our dataset have (also) state 
(controlled) media. Hence, changes in media structure may have important implications 
for public policy, simply because the objective function of state vs. commercial media 
could be different. For example, Prat and Strömberg (2005) show that a shift from 
state-control to private-control of TV news, attracted viewers previously undersupplied 
with information and contributed to increase both voter information and political 
participation. Thus, the above assumption of profit-maximizing media holds only, or 
especially, in situations where the media market is largely dominated by commercial 
firms. For this reason, the prediction about the effect of media bias on agricultural 
protection should also be affected by the media owner structure.   
We consider two different assumptions about the behavior of state media (Prat 
and Strömberg, 2005): (i) the public media is unbiased and/or the bias is randomly 
distributed across countries or, (ii) the public media reflects the political optimum for 
the government in the absence of commercial media, as the government control causes 
the public media to present the governments preferences.   
  11The first assumption, normally used in existing theoretical comparisons between 
state TV and commercial TV, is based on the idea that the former is managed by a 
social planner (see Anderson and Coate, 2005). This translates into a situation where 
the state media-induced political-bias is zero. Thus, an increase in private media should 
benefit agricultural groups in poor countries (who are taxed) and urban groups in rich 
countries (who are taxed), as these groups are the targets of profit maximizing media.  
Under the second assumption, when the media is controlled by the state, there is 
bias towards government preferences. In agricultural policy, government preferences 
are biased to favor urban interest in poor countries and agricultural interests in rich 
countries. Hence, an increase in the share of commercial media should reinforce the 
effect of hypothesis 1 by increasing the information available and the political 
participation of (large) groups of voters who, under the mass media state monopoly, 
had less information.  
In summary, this leads to the following empirical prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the share of private (state) media should be associated 
with higher (lower) agricultural protection in poor countries, and with lower (higher) 
protection in rich ones, ceteris paribus.     
 
3. Data and empirical specification 
We test our predictions on a sample of about 60 developing and developed 
countries observed from 1992 to 2005. Overall, we have more than 750 observations 
and the panel structure is quite balanced, with the only qualification that, for reasons 
explained below, the time coverage for transition countries starts from 1996.  
  123.1 Dependent variable  
Our dependent variable is the relative rate of assistance (RRA) to agriculture,  
calculated as the ratio between the agricultural and non-agricultural nominal rate of 
assistance:  RRA = [(1 −  NRAag)/(1  −  NRAnonag)-1], where NRAag is the nominal 
assistance to agriculture and NRAnonag is the nominal assistance to non-agricultural 
sectors. The NRA is measured as the weighted average of the nominal rate of assistance 
at the product level, using as a weight the industry’s value share of each product (see 
Anderson and Valenzuela 2008 for calculation details). Thus, the NRA represents the 
tax equivalent of those border and domestic measures that are under the direct control 
of the ruler, like import and export tax, subsidies and quantitative restriction, plus 
domestic taxes or subsidies for farm output and input. One of the key advantages of 
using RRA (instead of NRA) as our dependent variable is that, especially in developing 
countries, an important indirect taxation source for agriculture is the positive protection 
given to the manufacturing sector as an effect of import-substitution policies. Thus, the 
RRA is a more useful indicator in undertaking an international comparison of the extent 
to which a country’s policy regime has an anti- or pro-agricultural bias (see Anderson 
and Valenzuela 2008).  
 
3.2 Mass media variables 
To test the predictions about the effect of the mass media on agricultural policy 
we needed data on both the share of informed voters, ρs, and on the state vs. private 
structure of the media markets.  
  13The share of informed voters, ρs, is proxied by the log of TV sets per-capita, 
(log_tvpc) taken from the Arthur S. Banks Cross National Time-Series Data Archive. 
The rationale for using this variable comes from the argument that, while the share of 
informed voters, ρs, is not observed, we in fact observe the share of media users, rs(qs), 
that is increasing in news coverage qs. Because rs, ρs and qs move in the same direction, 
it is sufficient to look at the levels and changes in the share of media users, rs, to test the 
effect of media bias (see Strömberg, 2004b). Moreover, another justification for the use 
of this indicator derive from the Strömberg’ consideration that “the emergence of 
broadcast media increased the proportion of rural and low-education media consumers 
as it became less expensive to distribute radio waves than newspapers to remote areas, 
and as these groups preferred audible and visual entertainment to reading. As 
politicians could reach rural and low-education voters more efficiently, the model 
predicts an expansion in programmes that benefit these voters” (2004, p. 266).  
The variable characterizing the structure of the media market is based on the 
Djankov et al (2003) media ownership data set. This paper examines the patterns of 
media ownership in 97 countries around the world, disentangled from state and private 
ownership of both newspaper and broadcasting media. From this data set, we use the 
top five shares of private television (tvpsh) under the plausible hypothesis that 
ownership shapes the information provided to voters and consumers. Of course, as 
suggested by Djankov et al (2003), ownership is not the only determinant of media 
content, as in many countries government regulates private media. Thus, our 
identification assumption is correct only if government regulations do not, in our 
sample, strongly bias the information coverage of private TVs.  
  14The share of private TVs refers to 1998-99, and we assume that it remains quite 
stable over the observed period, as suggested by Djankov et al (2003). However, the 
same authors highlight that timing could be an issue, especially in transition economies 
where many media enterprises were privatized during the transition period or have 
increasing rates of foreign ownership. To reduce this potential source of bias the time 
coverage for these countries starts in 1996 or later, thus six years from the initial 
transition period. Moreover, in some specifications we checked for the status of 
‘transition’ countries through a dummy variable.   
Finally, for reasons explained below, and to reduce potential bias induced by 
differences in government control and regulation of private TV, we also use in some 
regressions an index of press media freedom. It assumes values equal to 0, 0.5 and 1 for 
countries that are respectively not-free, partially-free and free, based on information 
taken from Freedom House.  
 
3.3 Other variables 
In the empirical specification we include, apart from the mass media variables 
discussed above, some additional controls that are likely to affect the level of 
agricultural protection, as suggested by previous literature. Specifically, we start by a 
parsimonious specification where, as structural control, we include only the level of 
development, gdppc, measured by the real per capita GDP taken from the World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, and the share of agricultural employment, emps, based 
on  Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data. The inclusion of the level of 
development allows us to control for the so-called ‘development paradox’ – namely the 
strong positive correlation between agricultural protection and per capita GDP – that 
  15represents one of the most important stylized fact of agricultural protection patterns 
(see Swinnen, 1994; Anderson, 1995). On the other hand, the inclusion of the 
agricultural employment share acts as a control for the well known idea that small 
groups normally receive more protection and support.  Moreover, we always control for 
any unobserved time effect by adding a set of time dummies to the specification. 
Next, in a second stage we tested the robustness of our finding by adding to the 
specifications other controls like proxies for comparative advantage, political 
institutions, as well as regional fixed effects. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of 
the variables used in the empirical model.    
 
4. Econometric strategy and results  
The two hypotheses put forward in section (2.3) emphasize that the relationship 
between media variables and agricultural protection is conditional upon the level of 
development. Thus, one econometric strategy would be to interact our media variables 
with the level of development. However, a serious shortcoming of this approach is that 
the level of development per se, is an important determinant of agricultural protection, 
and moreover it is also strongly correlated with both the level of TV per capita, 
log_tvpc, and the share of commercial TV, tvpsh. Thus, this approach introduces too 
much collinearity into the model, rendering the identification problematic.
3  
An alternative strategy followed in this paper is to split the data set in two sub-
samples of ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ countries, respectively, and then to run differentiated 
regressions introducing our media variables linearly. To implement this strategy we 
                                                 
3 The pair wise correlation between our key variables are, indeed, as follows: 0.75 (gdppc vs. 
log_tvsh); 0.92 (gdppc vs. gdppc*log_tvsg); 0.65 (gdppc vs. tvps); and 0.89 (gdppc vs gdppc*tvps).   
  16need to choose the cut off level of development. As theory offers no guidance to this 
problem, we start by assuming that the turning point of our relationship is just the 
sample median value of gdppc, equal to about 3,800 US $. Then, we check the 
robustness of this assumption by increasing or decreasing this break down value.  
























it X tvpsh tvpc gdppc rra ε ζ β β β α + + + + + = ∑ 6 5 4 log                    (7) 
where the upper cases, L and H, indicate countries with gdppc levels respectively lower 
and higher than 3,800 US dollars; β1-β6 are the coefficients to be estimated; Xit is a 
vector of additional controls; finally εit are i.i.d. error terms. Our theoretical predictions 
suggest that the expected signs of our key media coefficients, β2-β3 and β5-β6, should be 
as follows: β2 and β3 > 0 and β5 and β6 < 0. Moreover, as a consequence of the 
‘development paradox’, the coefficients β1 and β4 are expected to be positive. 
 
4.1 Results 
Table 2 shows the pooled OLS regressions over the 1992-2005 period for 
different specifications based on relations (6) and (7). In Column (1) we test the 
hypothesis that the effect of our two media variables on agricultural protection is linear, 
thus running the model on the full sample. The results show that neither the share of 
informed voters, proxy by TV sets per-capita, nor the share of private televisions, exert 
any significant effect on the relative rate of assistance. As expected, the level of 
development, gdppc, and the agricultural labor share, emps, are respectively positive 
and negative, but only the former is significant at the conventional level. It may be 
  17interesting to note that when we run the regressions without media variables, the 
employment share is always negative and significant in all the specifications reported in 
the Table.  
To test our non-linearity hypothesis put forward in Section 2.3 we split the 
sample into ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ countries. This is done in Columns (2) and (5), where the 
sample is divided into ‘low’ income (gdppc < 3,800 US$) and ‘high’ income (gdppc > 
3,800 US$) countries, respectively, using as break down the median value of the 
sample distribution.
4  
In these regressions the two media variables are both strongly significant 
(p_value < 0.05) and, more importantly, they change in sign on passing from low 
(positive) to high (negative) income country sample. More specifically and in line with 
our hypotheses, we find that mass media-induced political bias, captured by the share of 
media users, and the share of private media increase agricultural protection in poor 
countries, but they reduce it in rich-developed ones, ceteris paribus.  
Comparing the effect of the two samples indicates that the effect of our media 
variables is significantly stronger in rich vs. poor countries. Specifically, the absolute 
value of the estimated coefficients are from 3 (tvps) to 10 (log_tvpc) times higher in the 
‘high income’ than in the ‘low income’ regression. A potential explanation for this 
result is that countries with a higher level of development also have better democratic 
institutions, that translate into a more accountable political environment. To see 
whether this is the case, Columns (4) and (7) control for political institutions, by 
                                                 
4 In the regressions in the table, we give the possibility for each country-year observation to enter the 
low or high income sample on the basis of its level of development. Thus, as it is clear by the 
number of countries reported at the bottom of the table, three countries enter simultaneously, in 
different years, in the two regressions. Note however that, even if we force each country to join only 
one sample, by using the country-average median as the cut-off value, the results are qualitatively 
and quantitatively the same.     
  18including the Polity2 index of democracy taken from the Polity IV data set
5, as well as 
regional fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Controlling for 
democracy appears important, as a potential reason for the above results is that our 
media variables are capturing the effect of (omitted) political institutions that are 
themselves important determinants of policy outcome (see Persson and Tabellini, 
2003). The democracy index is significant and positive in the low income regression, 
but it is not significant in the high income sample. These patterns are consistent with 
other studies who find that better political institutions tend to reduce agricultural policy 
distortions (see Olper and Raimondi, 2009). Importantly for our analysis, the inclusion 
of the democracy index has only a minor effect on the coefficients of media variables, 
which are still significant and with their expected sign. 
Regressions (3) and (6) add to the specification two proxies for comparative 
advantage which are often used in empirical studies on the political economy of 
agricultural policy: agricultural land per capita and agricultural net export share, 
measured as the ratio between export (minus import) to agricultural production. The 
two variables have their expected negative sign, adding significant explanatory power 
to the models, but they do not significantly change the effect of the media variables. 
This preliminary evidence of the effect of the mass media-competition-induce 
political bias on agricultural protection supports our general arguments. Both the share 
of informed voters, here proxied by the TV sets per-capita, as well as the share of 
commercial TVs, positively affect RRAs in ‘poor’ developing countries, and have a 
negative effect on RRAs in countries with higher development levels. In the ‘low’ 
                                                 
5 The Polity2 index assigns a value ranging from -10 to +10 to each country and year, with higher 
values associated with better democracies. 
  19income countries sample the average level of protection is negative. Therefore these 
results also indicate that mass media induce an overall reduction of agriculture policy 
distortions. 
     
4.2 Robustness checks  
In this section we test whether potential econometric problems may affect our 
results. A first problem may come from our arbitrary assumption about the separation 
between low and high income countries: is the median development value a correct 
separation level or not? To check for this potential source of bias, columns (1) to (4) of 
Table 3 show the regression results obtained by increasing or decreasing the separation 
value between low and high income sample. Overall, the bias induced appears quite 
low. More specifically, the results change little for threshold values below and above 
the break down of 3,100 US$, where the (absolute) estimated coefficient and the 
significant level of, especially, the TV sets per capita variable, drop somewhat. 
Differently, the results with a threshold of 4,500 US$, are very close to, or slightly 
better than, those reported in Table 2 (columns (4) and (7)), suggesting that the ‘true’ 
threshold drop between this value and the median value of the distribution. Thus, from 
this evidence we conclude that the choice of the median gdppc as the break down level 
of the distribution does not introduce substantial bias into our results.  
A second problem could come from the fact that, especially in the low income 
sample, there are several countries without democratic institutions where, potentially, 
the private media are under the control of the ruler. If this is the case, then it is not 
surprising to find that the media variables in this sample exert, compared to high 
income countries, a lower effect on agricultural protection. We tackled this potential 
  20source of bias in two different ways. First, in regressions (5) and (6) of Table 3, we 
considered only country-year observations with a Polity2 index that was strictly 
positive, or higher than 6,  thus eliminating from the sample all autocracies (low 
income sample) or not well established democracies (high income  sample). Second, in 
columns (7) and (8) we added to the specifications an index of media freedom based on 
Freedom House. 
The results of these alternative regressions do not indicate that non democratic 
countries, or countries with less media freedom, determine the differences between the 
low and high income samples. More specifically, dropping autocracies from the low 
income sample reduces, if anything, the magnitude of the media variables. Similarly, 
the media freedom proxy is negative and not significant in the low income regression, 
and turns out to be positive and barely significant in the high income sample, but in 
both cases it only marginally affects the absolute magnitude of the estimated media 
coefficients. 
A final concern is linked to our assumption that, in the observed period (1992-
2005), the structure of the media markets remained stable. This is admittedly a strong 
assumption, forced by the fact that our indicator of the commercial TV share, tvpsh, is 
only available for 1998-1999. Moreover, working with a panel starting in 1992 also 
introduces potential simultaneity problems. To reduce this potential source of bias we 
ran a series of regressions working with a panel starting in 1998 and ending in 2004
6. 
Thus, by construction, we left out potential endogeneity issues, rendering the 
                                                 
6 Due to the evidence discussed above (see Table 3), and as moving the sample onward increases the 
GDP per capita median value, the break down of the two samples of these regressions is set at 4,200 
US dollars.  
  21hypothesis of no structural change in the media market more credible.
7 The results of 
these additional regressions are reported in Table 4. 
This further manipulation of the data set introduced some changes in the 
estimated coefficients, especially for the low income sample where the significance of 
the share of private TVs goes down in regressions where we check for democracy 
(Polity2), a variable that turned out to be strongly significant (see columns 3 and 4). 
Thus, from this point of view, it is difficult in the low income sample to disentangle the 
effect of the media market per se from that of other institutional dimensions captured 
by the democracy index. However, the coefficient of the TV private share is still always 
positive in the ‘poor’ country sample and, once again, turns out to be negative and 
strongly significant in the high income sample.  
In summary, the robustness checks reported in this section give general support 
to the conclusion that mass media-competition-induced political bias is important in 
agricultural policy and, interestingly, it goes in the direction suggested by theory. 
Agricultural protection appears affected by both the share of informed voters and the 
share of private television, but not in a linear fashion. Both these media variables tend 
to increase protection (or reduce taxation) in poor countries but strongly reduce it in 
rich ones, and, thus, reduce distortions in all countries.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
                                                 
7 It is important to note that in the observed period the dynamics of the media (TV) structure tend to 
move toward an increase in the share of commercial TVs. Thus, at least in theory, our results should 
be reinforced by adding this time dimension to the data, as in our low and high income country 
samples the trend in agricultural protection goes in opposite directions. In fact RRAs is increasing in 
the low income country sample but it is decreasing the high income sample..   
  22This paper provides evidence on the relationship between mass media 
competition and agricultural protection for a large group of countries. Strömberg’s 
(2004a) theory predicts that information provided by mass media reflects the media’s 
incentives to provide news to different groups in society, affecting the groups’ 
influence in policy-making. As a consequence mass media competition will induce a 
policy bias towards large groups because these groups are more informed voters as the 
mass media target them.  
We apply this theory to agricultural policy.  This results in the hypotheses that 
(a) the impact of mass media competition on agricultural policy will be conditional to 
the level of development, and (b) that this effect is opposite to the so called 
‘development paradox’ of agricultural policies. Thus, the traditional switch of 
agricultural policy from taxation to subsidization which is associated with economic 
development will be smoothed in the presence of mass media competition.  
We use data on agricultural policy from 60 countries, spanning a wide range of 
development stages and media markets, to test these predictions. In line with the 
theoretical hypotheses, we find that public support to agriculture is strongly affected by 
the structure of the mass media markets. In particular, a greater role of the private mass 
media in society is associated with policies which benefit the majority more: it reduces 
taxation of agriculture in poor countries and reduces subsidization of agriculture in rich 
countries, ceteris paribus.  
This evidence is consistent with the idea that increased competition in 
commercial media reduces transfers to special interest groups and contributes to more 
efficient public policies, as a better informed electorate increases government 
accountability.    
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Table 1.  
Descriptive statistics  
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. N. obs. N. countries
Relative rate of assistance 19.20 7.61 267.94 -87.87 52.85 753 59
Log TV per capita 5.38 5.83 7.38 1.10 1.23 753 59
Tv private share 0.45 0.43 1.00 0.00 0.31 753 59
GDP per capita 9797 3790 39969 79 11124 753 59
Agricultural employment share 0.27 0.14 0.85 0.01 0.26 753 59
Land per capita 1.28 0.56 26.83 0.04 3.31 753 59
Net export share -0.01 0.01 1.20 -1.22 0.41 753 59
Democracy index (Polity2) 5.98 8.00 10.00 -7.00 5.42 753 59
Press freedom 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 753 59 
Notes: See text for variables description. 
 
 
  26 Table 2.  
Effect of the media on agricultural protection: econometric results 
Dependent variable
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log TV per capita 4.79 5.77*** 4.08* 5.34* -56.94** -47.82** -46.93*
1.42 2.60 1.78 1.66 -2.52 -2.31 -1.84
TV private share -12.07 19.94*** 19.06*** 17.76** -76.03*** -70.01*** -89.23***
-1.09 3.14 3.10 2.52 -3.33 -3.18 -3.08
GDP per capita 0.03*** 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
4.54 0.88 1.43 1.14 4.86 5.15 3.59
Agricultural employment share -25.32 -14.98 -18.73 -14.44 136.39 166.85 -19.37
-1.36 -1.18 -1.51 -0.99 1.12 1.52 -0.15
Land per capita -6.35*** -7.34*** -0.65 1.02
-3.19 -2.97 -1.36 1.05
Net export share -10.58** -9.46** -27.99*** -16.04***
-2.31 -1.94 -4.50 -2.55
Democracy index (Polity 2) 0.70* -0.31
1.66 -0.10
Continental dummies No No No Yes No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Sample Low        
Income
Low        
Income
Low        
Income
High     
Income
High     
Income
High     
Income
Nr. Obs. 753 379 379 379 381 376 376
N r .  C o u n t r i e s 5 93 33 33 33 33 33 3
Adj R square 0.47 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.53 0.66
- Agricultural Relative Rate of Assistance -
 
Notes: t-values robust to heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation in italics under the coefficients. The break down for Low and High income samples correspond to a 
gdppc level of 3,800 US dollars. (See text). 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.  
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Robustness checks: econometric results across different samples 
Dependent variable
Variables ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Log TV per capita 3.30 6.48** -35.91 -46.56* 3.44 -56.93** 5.46* -53.01**
0.96 2.09 -1.58 -1.74 0.72 -2.24 1.66 -2.03
TV private share 19.79*** 16.72** -80.77*** -97.58*** 15.15** -60.45* 18.03*** -77.48***
2.65 2.44 -2.80 -3.31 2.11 -1.94 2.60 -2.61
GDP per capita 0.06** 0.01 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03 0.05*** 0.03 0.05***
2.13 0.65 3.38 3.71 1.45 4.11 1.01 3.66
Agricultural employment share -17.05 -11.93 17.06 28.22 -19.43 51.03 -16.31 -22.93
-1.11 -0.83 0.17 0.19 -1.52 0.39 -1.11 -0.18
Land per capita -6.71** -7.43*** 0.87 1.28 -5.94** 0.26 -7.15*** 0.79
-2.54 -3.08 0.91 1.30 -2.51 0.26 -2.90 0.81
Net export share -11.53** -8.30* -15.83** -17.26*** -9.50 -16.14*** -10.62** -14.80**
-2.16 -1.81 -2.55 -2.70 -1.45 -2.73 -2.16 -2.45
Democracy index (Polity 2) 0.50 0.79 0.48 -1.32 2.34*** -7.40 0.78* -1.90
1.09 1.96 0.17 -0.30 3.27 -0.86 1.80 -0.53
Press freedom -2.84 33.85*
-0.65 1.71
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample gdppc < 3100 gdppc < 4500 gdppc > 3100 gdppc > 4500
gdppc < 3800; 
Polity > 0
gdppc > 3800; 
Polity > 6
gdppc < 3800 gdppc > 3800
Nr. Obs. 339 403 409 352 247 351 377 376
Adj R square 0.46 0.48 0.65 0.66 0.55 0.68 0.48 0.67
- Agricultural Relative Rate of Assistance -
 
Notes: t-values robust to heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation in italics under the coefficients.   
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.  
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Robustness checks: pooled regressions in the 1998-2004 time period 
Dependent variable
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log TV per capita 8.64*** 7.07*** 7.26** 6.63* -43.32* -37.55* -31.49 -29.63
3.31 3.00 2.47 1.83 -1.71 -1.62 -1.32 -1.23
TV private share 18.83** 16.97** 8.55 5.89 -71.50*** -62.37*** -68.11** -78.76**
2.45 2.35 1.24 0.80 -2.77 -2.59 -2.53 -2.54
GDP per capita 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
0.83 1.18 1.02 1.00 3.65 4.14 4.11 3.10
Agricultural employment share -4.67 -10.25 0.45 4.89 91.55 141.88 107.77 -42.13
-0.36 -0.79 0.03 0.31 0.62 1.10 0.85 -0.31
Land per capita -8.78*** -10.40*** -11.05*** -0.99 -0.87 0.46
-2.85 -3.93 -3.24 -1.79 -1.43 0.39
Net export share -7.48 -5.86 -5.28 -26.50*** -25.52*** -12.13*
-1.54 -1.06 -0.95 -3.99 -4.01 -1.75
Democracy index (Polity 2) 1.50*** 1.47*** -7.54 -3.44
2.83 2.66 -1.14 -0.95
Continental dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample
Low        
Income
Low        
Income
Low        
Income
Low        
Income
High        
Income
High        
Income
High        
Income
High        
Income
Nr. Obs. 212 212 212 212 223 223 223 223
Adj R square 0.42 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.49 0.5 0.66
- Relative Rate of Assistance in Agriculture -
 
Notes: t-values robust to heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation in italics under the coefficients. The break down for Low and High income samples correspond to a 
gdppc level of 4,200 US dollars. (See text). 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.  
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